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ABSTRACT

An Ë npirical Examination o f the Factor That Influence Venture Capital Investment
and the Location o f Fimds
by
Sandra Phillips Johnson
Dr. Nasser Daneshvary, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Economics
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Entrepreneurs who contribute to economic growth have looked to venture capital
firms as a major source o f financing. This thesis tests the sigm'fîcance o f explanatory
variables for investment in venture capital at both the national and regional levels. The
explanatory variables predicting national new investment in venture capital include
capital gains tax rates, stock market pricing, risk premiums, and regulations on pension
fund investment Further, this thesis examines whether the location o f venture capital
funds depends on research and development funds at universities within a state, state
corporate income tax burdens, state unemployment rates, and average weekly earnings
witliin a state.

m

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................... iü
U STO FH G U R ES....................................................................................................vi
LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................................vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................... viü
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION............................................................................I

CHAPTER n THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY..................................... 4
History o f the Venture Capital Industry in the United States........................ 6
Structure o f the Venture Capital Industry....................................................... 8
Independent Private Firms............................................................................... 9
The Venture Capital Investment Process...................................................... 11
CHAPTER m
LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................... 15
Capital Gains Taxation................................................................................... 16
The “Lock-in” Effect o f Capital Gains Taxation.......................................... 16
Capital Gains Taxes and Investment Returns............................................... 19
Venture Capital Investment and Financial M arkets.................................... 21
Regional or State Influences on Venture Capital Investment...................... 23
Regional Agglomeration Tendencies............................................................ 24
Empirical Studies o f Regional Location Decisions..................................... 26
Summary......................................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER rv
THE EMPIRICAL MODELS.................................................31
Annual New Investment in Venture Capital.................................................31
Regional Location o f Venture Capital Funds...............................................36
CHAPTER V
DATA AND METHODOLOGY_____________________ 40
Sources o f the D ata........................................................................................ 40
Construction o f the Series.............................................................................. 42
Summary Statistics on the D ata.....................................................................45

IV

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VI
EMPIRICAL RESULTS............................................................51
Annual New Investment in Venture Capital Estimation Results................. 51
Regional Venture Capital Estimation R esults..............................................54
CHAPTER Vn

CONCLUSION.......................................................................... 57

APPENDIX A
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION............................................... 60
Venture Capital Firms and Financial Interm ediation.................................. 60
Portfolio Allocation Model............................................................................61
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................64
VITA......................................................................................................................... 68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE I

Venture Capital Industry Resources.........................................

5

FIGURE 2

Venture Capital Industry Segments..........................................

9

RG URE3

New Investment in Independent Private Firms........................

10

FIGURE 4

Sources o f New Investment in Venture C apital......................

11

FIGURES

An Overview o f the Venture Capital Investment Process...... ...... 12

VI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UST OF TABLES

TABLE I Long-Term Capital Gains Realization Elasticities.............................. 18
TABLE 2 Literature Summary: New Investment in Venture Capital................. 29
TABLE 3 Literature Summary: Regional Location o f Funds..............................30
TABLE 4

Summary Statistics: Aimual New Investment M odel.........................45

TABLE 5 Aimual New Investment Correlation Matrix.......................................46
TABLE 6

Summary Statistics: Regional Investment M odel...............................47

TABLE 7 Correlation Matrix for the Regional M odel....................................... 49
TABLE 8 Annual New Investment Estimation Results.......................................52
TABLE 9

Regional Venture Capital Estimation Results.....................................54

vu

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I attended the opening session o f my first microeconomics class as a
continuing student at UNLV, I never imagined what a glorious journey awaited me. The
challenging and capable professor. Dr. Nasser Daneshvary, fired my interest in
economics. So, Dr. Daneshvary, I acknowledge and thank you for “lighting the flame”
and for your continual support and guidance to me as an unde^raduate and graduate
student
To my committee members, Drs. Clauretie, Cronovich, and Schwer, my heartfelt
appreciation for taking the tim e to read my voluminous drafts, and for your sage
recommendations towards fine tuning my research.
And, to the Department o f Economics Faculty, most o f you have instructed me in
graduate and undergraduate courses. I always learned from you, I always felt welcome
when I pestered you for clarifications, and you always demonstrated your dedication to
educating me. Thank yoiL Thanks also to the consitkrate, accomplished administrative
staff in the Economics D epartm ent
Finally, to my family, fiiends, and especially my husband, Charles— I could not
have reached this goal without your loving, constant support My gratitude is boundless.

vm

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The venture capital industry has emerged as an important component o f
America’s private equity m arket This market includes professional investment
partnerships, such as venture capital firms, that acquire significant stock holdings of
unregistered, private com panies/ Venture capital paitnerships have provided hard-tofind financing for entrepreneurs. And, many entrepreneurs have been credited with
fueling economic growth through the process o f technological irmovation.
Technological innovatiort as the Office o f the President noted, “is responsible for
a significant portion o f the increases in the standard o f living.”^ Indeed, Robert M.
Solow, recipient of the 1987 Nobel Prize in economics, pointed to technological
irmovation as a critical source o f a country’s economic growth.^ Venture capital
investment has funded iimovators such as Federal Express and many o f today’s leading

‘ George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f the Private
Eouitv Market (Wasfiington: Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, 1995),
p. 5.
“ The State of Small Business: A Retmrt o f the President: 1994 (Washington: U. S. GPO,
1995), p. 109.
^ Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Review
o f Economics and Statistics 39 (August 1957), pp. 312-320.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2
high technology fîims, including Genetech, Microsoft and Intel. * What, then, are
the economic A ctors that impact this market?
Today’s formal venture capital investment industry evolved during the late
sixties. Therefore, much o f the data necessary to study this industry covers a relatively
brief time ftame. However, research on venture capital has identifted several economic
variables thought to influence new investment flows. Minarik (1992), Proterba (1989),
and Bygrave and Shulman ( 1988) have investigated the effects o f capital gains taxation
on venture capital investm ent Studies have also examined the state o f stock markets for
small-capitalized companies as an explanatory variable o f new venture capital
investment^ Additionally, the venture capital industry has been studied from a regional
perspective. Among others. Green (1991), Florida and Kenney (1988b), and Leinbach
and Amrhein ( 1987) have studied regional patterns o f venture capital investment or high
technolo^f location factors. Thefr research identified several Actors, mcluding mature
financial centers and proximity to large research and development universities, as
attractors o f venture capital to a state or regiotL
Although a wealA o f research has focused on venture capital, many questions
remain regarding the effects o f capital gains taxation. The effects o f risk premiums on

Richard L. Florida and Martin Kenney, “V arture Capital, H i^ Technology, and
Regional Development,” Regional StuÆes 22.1 (1988), p. 33.
=William D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital GaAs Tax: Bane or Boon for
Venture Capital?” Frontiers o f Entrenreneurship Research (W ellesI^, MA: Babson
College Entrepreneurship ConArence, 1988)
*
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venture capital investment also merits empirical examinatioiL Further, a need exists for
empirical scrutiny o f economic factors that influence the location o f venture capital
fonds.
Our national legislators frequently engage in debate on the effects o f increases or
decreases in capital gains tax rates upon businesses and economic growth. Empirical
knowledge o f how such changes impact venture capital can lead to better informed
decisions. In addition, with knowledge o f which economic factors in a state affect
location and investment decisions o f the venture capital industry, state legislators can
better plan for economic development
This study, therefore, examines national new investment in venture capital. It
analyzes historical data from 1969 through 1995 to identify the effects o f interest rates,
stock market performance, pension plan legislatiort and changes in capital gains tax rates
on national venture capital investment In addition, it investigates how total venture
capital within a state is influenced by corporate tax burdens, university research and
development average weekly earnings, and unemployment rates. Data used for the
regional analysis covers fifty states and the District o f Columbia between 1993 and 1995.
This paper is composed o f seven major sections. F irst the introduction provitks
the background and purpose for this study. N ext a brief overview o f the venture capital
industry is giveiL The third section reviews the literature and empirical analyses
consulted for this stucty. The forth section presents the econometric models adopted for
this analysis. T heit the data and methotfology used for this analysis are given in section
five. Subsequently, section six presents the results ofthe econometric analyses. Finally,
section seven (fetails the conclusions reached as a result o f this stwfy.
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CHAPTER

n

THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY
Since its formal emergence in 1946, the venture capital industry has fluctuated
between periods o f rapid expansion and periods o f sharp contractions. This industry
boomed in the early- and mid-1960s, only to shrink dramatically from 1969 to the mid1970s.® Venture capital investments surged again between the late 1970s and the 1980s.
Then, after a brief downturn in the early nineties, venture capital investments grew to
record levels o f $4.3 billion o f new investments in independent private firms during
1995. In that same year, $37 billion in total funds was under management by the total
venture capital industry.^ As Figure I shows, total funds under management by the
venture capital industry have maintained an upward growth trend since 1983.*

®William D. Bygrave and J e ffry A. Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 21.
Venture Economics fovestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed.
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing 1996), pp. 4,15 .
* Total fimds under management include funds invested by venture capital firms mto
portfolio firms as well as new investment funds received by venture capital firms.
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Figure I. Venture capital industry resources; 1983-1995

When stuctying the (fynamics o f venture capital investment, it is helpful to
understand the industry structure, the roles o f its key players, and the manner in which
fimds are invested and returns distributed. An understanding o f the basic characteristics
ofth e venture capital industry can lead to more accurate predictions on its responses to
changes in economic variables.
This chapter will provide a brief overview o f the venture capital industry. First,
the history o f venture capital investment will be reviewed. Next, the structure o f the
venture capital industry will be discussed, with an emphasis
on independent private firms. And finally, the cycle o f venture capital investment will be
examined.
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History o f the Venture Capital Industry in the United States
The origins o f today’s venture capital industry in the US can be traced back to the
founding o f American Research and Development (ARD) in Massachusetts in 1946/
This organization o f MTT colleagues formed with the objective of investing in emerging
ventures. Its investment o f approximately $70 thousand in Digital Eqm'pment Company
(DEC) in 1957 reaped manifold returns when the firm went public in I960. When DEC
shares were offered to the public through an initial public offering (IPO), ARD’s shares
rose in value firom $25 per share to $74.10 per share. The success o f ARD’s investment
in DEC fueled growth in the venture capital industry in the 1960s and 1970s.
A major offshoot o f ARD’s success was the establishment o f small business
investment corporations (SBICs) by the US Small Business Administration (SBA). In
1958, SBICs were established to create pools o f capital for the development and
formation o f new v e n tu r e s .T h e SBICs were licensed and regulated by the government
and were able to provide four-to-one leveraging for loans to emerging small businesses.
They were at the forefi’ont o f the venture capital industry’s early expansion and grew to
approximately 700 firms by the mid-1960s.
However, a stock-market downturn in late 1969, along with recessionary
pressures and Vietnam-War related tax increases almost yielded a deathblow to the
SBICs. SBIC-funded new ventures, financed by debt as opposed to equity, faltered as
their cash flows failed to support debt payments. Their troubles led to new SBA
regulations that reduced the number o f SBICs in the progranL The influence o f SBICs

’w illiam D. Bygrave and Je ffry A. Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 17-19.
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has continued to wane in the venture capital world. SBIC gross loans and investments
outstanding for the 1990 fiscal year totaled only $2.6 billioiL^^ In comparison, private
venture capital firms, exclusive o f SBICs, managed $24,139 billion during the same
calendar year.
Researchers have credited several Actors for Ae emergence o f private venture
capital firms as Ae dominant segment o f A e industry. One such A ctor identified by
Fenn, Liang, and Prowse was A e organizational innovation o f a lim ited partnership
stru ctu re.T h is irmovation reduced information search costs and risk for mexperienced
investors in venture capital. These improvements were accomplished by parAering
mexperienced mvestors wiA experienced venture capital firms that could make better
selections o f entrepreneurial firms m which to buy equity holdings. Venture capital
firms, Aerefore, can be viewed as financial mtermediaries between inexperienced
mvestors and entrepreneurial firms. Yuk-Shee Chan also identifies venture capital firms
as financial intermediaries who can reduce information and search costs."
Additionally, Fenn, Liang, and Prowse cited changes in legislation regarding
pension fiduciaries as an augmenting influence on mdustry growA.‘^ For example, Ae

Bygrave and Timmons, Venture Capital at A e Crossroads ( 1992L p. 21.
' ‘ SBIC Program Statistical Package, ed. John W ilmeA (Washington: LF. S. Small
Business Administration, 1993), p. 26.
Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed.
Ray Lam (New Yoric Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 6.
" George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f A e Private
Equity Market (Washington: Board o f Governors o f A e Federal Reserve System, 1995),
p. 4.
MChan, Yuk-Shee, “On A e Positive Role o f Financial AtermeAation in Allocation o f
Venture Capital m a Maricet w iA hnperfoct Information,” The Journal O fFinance 38.5
(December 1983), pp. 1543-1568.
Fenn, L ian^ and Prowse (1995), pp. 13-14.
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“Prudent Man” Rule o f 1979 altered A e Employment Retirement Acome Security Act
(ERISA) by allowmg pension managers to invest m Agher-risk instruments such as
venture capital. A addition, A e “Safe Harbor” Regulation for ERISA m 1980 removed
A e fiduciary role for venture capital firms that accepted pension fimds as limited
partners.
The rate o f taxation on capital gains is also Aought to influence mvestment m
venture capital. Dworsky hypoAesized that reductions m capital gains taxation led to
mcreases venture capital mvestment*® A sum, many factors have been cited as
contributing to A e rise o f mdependent private venture capital firms to a predominant
position m A e venture capital mdustry mcludmg: limited partnersAp structures; relaxed
regulations for pension fiduciaries; and capital gains tax reductions.

Structure o f Ae Venture Capital Industry
Today’s venture capital industry is composed o f three major types o f investment
firms. These categories mclude mdependent private firms, corporate mdustrial groups,
and venture capital subsidiaries o f financial corporations.*^ However, as seen m Figure
2, mdependent private firms have emerged as A e dommant sector o f tAs industry.
Because o f A eir dominant position m A e industry, as well as A e avAlability o f data.

*®Alan J. Dworsky, “The Case for Raismg A e Capital Gains Tax: Undomg A e Damage
From Venture Capital,” Financial Analysts Journal (MarcAApril 1986), pp. 69-70.
Stanley E. Pratt, “The Organized VetAue Capital Community,” Pratt’s Gmde to
Venture Capital Resources, ed. Ted Weissberg (New York: Securities Data PublisAng,
1995), p. 91.
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independent private firms are evaluated in this study. The major characteristics o f
mdependent private firms are detailed in this sectiorr

Venture Capital Adustry Segments
Corporate
Financial
16%

Corporate
Independent

1%

Independent
Private
83%

.Shurre- Vennge Fconomie» TnveWor Service» 1996

Figure 2. Venture capital industry segments in 1995

Adependent Private Firms

Adependent private firms represent Ae major source o f organized venture capital
fimds.** Between 1969 and 1995, Aese firms experienced Agh variability m inflows o f
new finds from investors. The paA o f new mvestment to independent private firms is
exhibited m Figure 3.

18

Pratt (1995), p. 92.
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Annual New Investment Fbws to Adependent Venture Capital
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Figure 3. New mvestment m independent private firms: 1969-1995

Adependent private firms controlled 83 percent o f A e $37 billion under
management m A e venture capital mdustry for 1995.*’ One segment o f tAs category is
composed o f family groups such as A e Rockefellers, PApps, and Whitney organizations.
Adependent private firms Aso mclude professional parAersAps that mvest fimds
received fi’om pensions, major corporations, mdviduals and fAnilies, endowments and
foundations, insurance firms, and fi)reign investors.
Pension fimds were A e largest source o f new mvestment fiows to mdependent
private firms durmg 1995. Pensions provided approximately SI .656 billion, or 38
percent of Ae $4.227 billion total o f new inflows to mdependent private firms m 1995.“

*’ Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed.
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data PublisAng, 1996), p. 7.
“ Venture Economics Investor Services (1996), p. 15.
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Endowments and foundations were the next laigest source o f new venture investment
flows, committing 23 percent o f total new fimds in 1995. Insurance companies,
mdividuals and families, and corporations provided approximately 19 percent, 18
percent, and 2 percent respectively o f 1995 new funds for independent private firms.
Figure 4 provides a grapAcal summary o f Ae sources o f new venture capital inflows to
mdependent private firms in 1995.

Sources ofN ew Investment Flows to
Independent Private Finns in 1995
Corporations

2X
Endowments
23%

Individuals
18%

Source: W nturc Economics Investor SErvices, 1996

Figure 4. Sources o f new investment m venture capital

The Venture Capital Investment Process
Adependent private firms act as financiA and management mtermeAaries
between entrepreneurs seeAng capitA and investors seekmg new, Agh-retum
investments. Bygrave and Shulman identify three major stakeholders m A e venture

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
capital process; limited partners, general partners, and portfolio firms.
Limited partners consist o f inAviduals and families, pension fimds, corporations,
insurance companies, foreigners, and endowments and foundations. They invest fimds
wiA venture capital firms. Next, venture capital firms, acting as general partners, use
A eir business and management expertise to identify entrepreneuriA firms w iA AghgrowA prospects. Equity positions are A en purchased from selected entrepreneurs or
portfolio companies. A grapAcA representation o f tA s mvestment process is presented
in Figure 5.
The Venture Capital Investment Process

LIMITED PARTNERS
laiBvidnii, PcnaioB Fmidik
toipaalioai. SofcigMB, and
Endownxnt» tn d

GENERAL
PARTNERS

Pu r e h n Eqütÿy
Stan»
!

invantFundt
tnde^oidcnt Pimic Fbnt

PORTFOLIO
COMPANIES
Entjrprenrm»

MHnisialnvMtDni

RMinwlolnwMn

INITIAL PUBLIC
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MERGER/

ACQUISmON
Sfeam id d to the pnbOc
prodedng gpitai pdm

L
\

'I

Figure 5. An overview o f Ae venture capitA mvestment process

WflKam D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “CapitA Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for
Venture CapitA?” Frontiers o f EntrepreneursAp Research (Well^lQf, MA: Babson
College EntiepreneursAp Conference, 1988), p. 324.
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Many entrepreneurs tend to obtain equity financing fi:om venture capital firms as
opposed to debt financing. As Fenn, Lian& and Prowse noted, debt financing is usually
not an Atemative for entrepreneurs due to A e Agh degree o f risk associated wiA A eir
busmess ventures.^ FurAer, new ventures tend to require a Agher degree o f mteraction
wiA experienced mvestors tAm is normally provided tAough debt financing.
Avestors m venture capitA earn their returns tAough A e appreciation o f A eir
sliares m A e portfolio compames as opposed to Avidend mcome. The appreciated
vAue, or capitA gain, is realized when Ae portfolio company advances to A e inAA
public ofiërmg (IPO) stage. Under an IPO a portfolio firm, wAch has been privately
owned, registers wiA A e Securities and Exchange Commission and “accesses A e public
capitA market t A o i ^ A e sAe o f securities.”^ However, a Agh degree o f risk is
associated wiA a new venture successfully reacAng Ae IPO stage. Alternately, venture
mvestors may have A eir appreciated shares purchased tAough private mergers or as
acqmsitions by oA er firms.
Phillips and Kirchhoff tested Ae old adage A at “four out o f five new firms fail
witAn A e first five years.”^^ Their resAts yielded a lower percentage-three out o f five
new firms—neverAeless, posing a Agh degree o f uncertainty for mvestors in new
ventures. TAs Agh (Agree o f risk associated wiA venture capitA mvestment leads A e

“ George W. Ferm, N eA e Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Econormcs o f A e Private
Equity Market (Washington: Board o f Governors o fth e FedecA Reserve System, 1995),
p. 18.
SeA C. Anderson, T. Randolph Beard, and J e f f i^ A. Bom, Initial Publie Offerings
(Boston: Kluwer Acadermc Publishers, 1995), p. 1.
Bruce D. Phillips and Bruce A. Kirchhoff “Formation, Growth, and SurvivA; Small
Fum Dynamics m A e U. S. Economy,” Small Busmess Economics 1 (1989), pp. 65-74.
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typically risk-averse investor to require a higher return &om such investments.
Indeed, high returns are not unusual for this industry. To illustrate. Venture Economics
cited returns at ‘^astronomical levels o f I year ERR o f 54.2% for funds formed during
1969-1995.”^ Such performance levels bode well for the continued growth o f the
venture capital industry.

^ Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed.
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 43.
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m

LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic research on the venture capital industry has expanded over the last
three decades, concurrent with the industry’s growth. Most empirical studies have
examined venture capital investment from 1969 onward, due to availability o f data
covering that period. Literature reviewed in this section falls into two categories; (I)
studies o f the economic variables predicted to afreet national investment in venture
capital, (2 ) and regional studies o f the impact o f locational and economic factors on
venture capital.
This section will first present summaries o f previous research and opinions
regarding the effect o f capital gains taxation on investment and the attendant implications
for national venture capital investment Subsequently, research examining the
relationship between venture capital investment and variables such as stock market
indices, interest rates, and the market for public offerings will be reviewed. Finally, the
chapter will conclude with a review o f regional and state economic conditions thought to
influence both venture capital location and investment activity.

15
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Capital Gains Taxation
The tax rate on long-term capital gains changed several times between
1969 and 1995, the period under consideration for this study. Long-term capital gains are
defined as the appreciation on assets held by investors for more than 6 months up until
1976, and greater than 12 months thereafter. Jane Gravelle icfentified the following
major movements o f the maximum individual tax rate on long-term capital gains; an
increase from 25 percent to 48 percent in 1969; a reduction to 28 percent in 1978; a
further reduction to 20 percent in 1981; an increase to 33 percent in 1986; and a decrease
to 28 percent in 1990. “
The literature expressed dichotomous opinions on the response o f investment in
venture capital to these tax rate changes. Some argued that increases in the marginal tax
rate on capital gains would lead to significant reductions in venture capital investments.
Yet, others posited minimal responses in venture capital investment due to changes in
capital gains taxation. A key argument against rate hikes on capital gains taxes centered
on the tendentty o f investors to hold appreciated equity in order to defer the payment o f
taxes on the appreciated value-the “lock-in” effect

The “Lock-in” Effect o f Capital Gains Taxation
Capital gains are not taxed until the appreciated equity is sold. Because o f this
interest-firee deferment o f taxation, investors are motivated to retain less than optimal
stocks, which have appreciated over tim e. John C. Goodman, president and CEO for the

“ Jane G. Gravelle, “History o f Capihil Gains Taxation,” The Economic Effects o f
Taxing Capital Income (Cambridge; MET Press, 1994), pp. 268-71.
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National Center for Policy Analysis, noted “Since selling is taxed and possessii^ is not,
high capital gains taxes encourage investors to hold rather than sell-thereby avoiding the
tax indefinitely.”^ Goodman’s view was echoed by Auerbach, who noted the “lock-in”
effect distorted efficiency in portfolio management

Consequently, if portfolio firms

represented more efficient investment alternatives, the “lock-in” effect would impede the
fiows o f investment dollars to venture capital.
Auten, Burman, and Randolph reviewed nine empirical studies which had
evaluated the “lock-in” effect by estimating how sales o f appreciated equity, or capital
gains realizations, responded to changes in capital gains taxation."^ These studies yielded
estimates, presented in Table 1 below, for the elasticity o f capital gains realizations to
changes in the marginal tax rates on the appreciation o f investments held for more than
six months

John C. Goodman, “The Case for a Capital Gains Tax Cut,” Capital Gains Tax Reform
and hvestm ent in Small Business. United States House ofRepresentatives: Committee
on Small Business (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 49.
^ Alan J. Auerbach, “O n the Design and Reform o f Capital Gains Taxation,” American
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings (May 1992), p. 263.
^ Gerald E. Auten, Leonard E. Burman, and William C. Randolph, “Estimation and
foterpretation o f Capital Gams Realization Behavior: Evidence From Panel Data,”
National Tax Journal 4 2 3 (September 1989), pp. 353-74.
^ Long-term gains were defined as appreciation on securities held a t least six months up
until 1976. After 1976, securities held for at least one year qualified for long-term gains
tax treatm ent
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Table I. Long-Term Capital Gains Realization Elasticities
Studies
Feldstein, Slemrod, and
Yttzhaki{l980)
VCnarik(198I)
Auten and G otfèlter
(1982)

U. S. Treasury (1985)

U. S. Treasury (1985)

Lindsey (1987)

Darby, CHUingham, and
Greenlees (1988)
Congressional Budget
Ofl5ce(I988)
Auerbach (1988)

D ata Type
Cross-Section, HighIncome Sample; 1973
Cross-Section, HighIncome Sample, 1983
Panel D ata, NGddleIncome Sample,
1967 to 1973

Capital Gams Type
Corporate Stocks

ReaUzation Elasticity
-3.75

Corporate Stocks

Panel Data,
1971 to 1975

AU Capital Assets

Range &om -0.44 to
-0.79
Short-Run Range: -0.91
to -3.46
Long-Run Range:
-0.36 t o -1.45
Long-Run Range:
-1.16 to -2.20

Time Series,
1954 to 1985,
An Taxpayers
Pooled Cross-Section and
Time Series,
1965 to 1982
Time Series,
1954 to 1985,
AU Taxpayers
Time Series,
1954 to 1985,
AH Taxpayers
Time Series,
1954 to 1986.
AU Taxpayers

AU Capital Assets

Corporate Stocks
AU Capital Assets

Long-Run: -2.07
Short-Run: - U
Long-Run: -0.8

AU Capital Assets

•Short-Run: -2.14
•Long-Run: -1.37

AU Capital Assets

•Long-Run Range:
-0.62 to -1.51

AU Capital Assets

•Range from -0.79 to
-0.99

AU Capital Assets

•Long-Run Range:
-0.06 to —
1.08

♦Derived at 25.4% average tax.
Source: Auten, Burman, and Randolph (1989) National Tax Journal. 355

The studies predicted from a .06 percent to almost a four percent decrease in
capital gains realizations when the marginal tax rate increased by one percent hi other
words, a one percent increase in the rate o f capital gains taxation could, at most, result in
up to a four percent decrease in sales o f appreciated equities by investors. Moreover,
even though researchers debated the magnitude o f the lock-in effect, they generally found
that increases in capital gains taxation could distort optimai portfolio decisions.
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Although Auten, Bunnan, and Randolph examined all mvestments,^^ not venture capital
investment specifically, one could hypothesize that the lock-in effect might prevent funds
from freely flowing into venture capital.

Capital Gains Taxes and Investment Returns
Some researchers also considered the depressing effects o f such increased capital
gains taxes on investment in stocks, which paid returns only through appreciation o f
equity. Bygrave and Timmons noted, “Within the venture capital industry, it is almost
universally believed that the federal capital gains tax rate is the most important influence
on the flows o f venture capital.”^^ Similarly, Rahn attributed a large drop in venture
capital investment to the capital gains tax increase from 20 percent to 28 percent in
1986.^^ He characterized the capital gains tax as “a direct levy on investment and
entrepreneurship, punishing and discouraging these activities.” ^
Dworslty presented another viewpoint on the effects o f capital gains tax rate cuts
and venture capital investm ent

He argued that lower capital gains tax rates resulted in

inefficient over-investment in venture capital funds. Dworsky noted the huge increases

Gerald E. Auten, Leonard E. Burman, and William C. Randolph, “Estimation and
Interpretation o f Capital Gains Realization B ehavior Evidence From Panel Data,”
National Tax Journal 423 (September 1989), pp. 353-74.
Bygrave and Tumnons, Venture Capital at the Crossroarfe (1992). p. 262.
^ Richard W. Rahn, “Capital Gains Taxes and the Investment Impact on Small
Business,” Congressional Testimony before the Committee on Small Busmess: United
States House ofRepresentatives (Internet, February 22,1995), p. 2.
^ Rahn (1995), p. 18Alan J. DworAqr, “The Case for Raising the Capital Gains Tax: Undoing the Damage
From Venture Capital,” Financial Analysts Journal (March/Aprü 1986), pp. 69-71.
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in venture capital funds from $39 million m 1977 to $11.5 billion in 1983.“ He
contended that such heated investment produced declines in share values and investor
losses because more new firms were created than the market could accommodate.
Other studies, however, have countered that capital gains taxes play no role in
venture capital investment Minarik found it unlikely that capital gains tax rate increases
deterred entrepreneurs from forming new businesses.^^ He stated, ”An entrepreneur who
believes that he has a million-dollar idea is unlikely to hold back because the capital
gains rate is 28 percent instead o f 22 p e r c e n t W h e n he examined the influence o f
individual investor responses to capital gains taxation, he cited estimates that over 85
percent o f formal venture capital was received from investors who were not subject to
capital gains taxes including; endowments and foundations, foreign investors, and
pension funds.
These assertions are supported by Proterba’s research, which evaluated data on
the capital structure o f start-up firms, sources o f venture capital, average tax rates on
venture capital, and annual start-up activity.” This study examined venture IPOs and
realized capital gains to assess whether the statutory increase on capital gains tax rates in
1986 had diminished investment funding for new ventures. After analyzing data over the
period o f 1977 - 1988, Proterba concluded that the increase in marginal tax rates on
capital gains for individuals did not have a major effect on the availability o f investment

“ Dworslty (1986), p. 69.
” Joseph J. Minarik, “Capital Gains Taxation, Growth, and Fairness,” Cdntemporarv
Policy Issues 10.3 (July 1992), p. 20.
“ M inarik (Juty 1992), p. 20.
” James M. Proterba, “Capital Gams Tax Polity Toward Entrepreneurship,” National
Tax Journal 42.3 (September 1989), pp. 375-389.
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funds for new ventures.'^ This conclusion was based on finding that corporations, taxexempt investors, and foreign investors who were not subject to individual capital gains
tax rates contributed the majority o f venture capital funding.
Therefore, competing views are presented by the literature on the effects o f
capital gains tax rate changes on venture capital investment One bocty o f research
predicts marked decreases in venture capital investment in response to increases in the
capital gains tax rate. Another body o f literature predicts little or no response in venture
capital investment when capital gains tax rates are increased.

Venture Capital Investment and Financial Markets
Econometric studies o f new investment in venture capital have also included
financial market variables. Bygrave and Shulman conducted empirical tests on annual
variables expected to influence investment flows into venture capital fimds.^' They
analyzed 18 years o f annual data from 1969 to 1987. The variables evaluated included;
the S&P 500 and NASDAQ indexes, short- and long-term Treasury issues, a dummy
variable for rate changes in capital gains taxes, and total dollar volumes o f IPOs. The
stock market indices and IPO level variables were chosen because rising stock index
values were projected to lead to better prospects for IPOs, thereby increasing returns to
venture capital investors. The stock m arket indices and IPO variables were expected to
positively influence investment flows into venture capital funds.

" Proterba (1989), p. 379.
William D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for
Venture Capital?” Frontiers o f Entrepreneurship Research (Wellesley, MA: Babson
College Entrepreneurship Conference, 1988), pp. 327-335.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
Short-term Treasury bills and long-term Treasury bonds were predicted to have
two directions o f influence on venture capital investment I f t h ^ were viewed as “risk
free alternatives to investments in venture capital flmds,”^~ venture capital investments
could be expected to decrease when returns on Treasury bills or bonds increased. Bodie,
Kane, and Marcus also identify the risk premium as an important variable when
analyzing portfolio choice."*^ On the other hand, if the rates on Treasuries were viewed as
the cost o f debt for entrepreneurs, venture capital investments could be expected to
increase when return rates on Treasury bills and Treasury bonds increased.
The capital gains tax dummy was set to zero for high-tax years (1970-1977, 1986,
and 1987) and set to one for low-tax years (1969, 1978-1985).^ These dummy values
reflected increases in the rate o f capital gains taxation from 25 percent to 48 percent in
1970, decreases in the rate to 28 percent in 1978, and increases in the rate to 33 percent
in 1986. After correcting for serial correlation with the Hildreth-Lu technique, removing
insignificant variables (IPO values), and eliminating variables with high multicollinearity
(S&P 500 index. Treasury bills, and Treasury bonds). Bygrave and Shulman reached
several findings.
First, the lagged NASDAQ index variable was the only statistically significant
variable identified by this esthnafioiL The coefiicient for the capital gains tax dummy

Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 327.
^ Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Alan J. Marcus. Investments (Boston: Lwin, 1989), pp. 130140. See Appendix A for further discussion on this theory.
^ Bygrave and Shulman designated 1969 and 1978-1985 as lower-tax years and set the
dummy variable to one durmg these years.
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was statistically insignificant In addition, the coefficient on the dummy variable for
capital gains tax rate changes multiplied by the lagged NASDAQ index, was
insignificant Bygrave and Shulman then concluded the evidence failed to support
predictions that increases in the capital gains tax rate would significantly reduce new
investment in venture capital/^ Instead, the value o f the NASDAQ index, lagged by one
year, was viewed as the m ost influential variable for predicting new venture capital
investm ent They cautioned, however, that the statistically insignificant results for the
capital gains tax variable were not conclusive, and proposed that the relative importance
o f capital gains taxation on venture capital investment might be overstated by popular
opinion.^

Regional o r State Influences on Venture Capital Investment
Venture capital investment has also been studied from a geographic viewpoint
The body o f literature has identified characteristics o f agglomeration in the location
decisions o f venture capital firms at a regional and state level. This section will first
review research that focused on regional concentration tendencies in venture capital
investment fi:om a basic statistical or geographical viewpoint N ext literature will be
reviewed which applied econometric analysis to conditions in states or regions to
determine the economic variables tiiat influence location decisions o f venture capital
firms.

45

Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 335.
“ Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 335.
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Regional Agglomeration Tendencies
Researchers have noted that venture capital activities are concentrated by region
and within states. Both the location o f venture capitalists and the location o f venture
capital investment in portfolio firms tend towards agglomération. During the early
1970s, Milford B. Green observed a concentration o f venture capital firms within large
urban areas with mature financial centers.^^ These early firms had spatial monopolies,
which eroded over time as new venture capitalists and new investment opportunities in
portfolio firms increased.
Green submitted that, over time, venture capitalists tended to develop market
niches. These niches evolved around characteristics that concurrently influenced
location and portfolio investment decisions. For example, when a venture capital firm
chose to locate in a specific city, the types o f firms seeking venture financing in that area
would constrain the choice o f industry in which investment dollars could be fmmeled.
Alternately, if the venture capital firm sought to invest in a particular industry, its choice
o f location would be constrained by the location o f entrepreneurial firms in that
industry.^ Additionally, he noted that independent private venture capital firms were
inclined towards investment in high-technology firms.” Thus, the location o f venture
capital activities is related to the economic activity m ix within the region.

Milford B. Green, “Preferences for US Venture Capital Investment: 1970-1988,”
Venture Capital: hitemational Comparisons, ed., Milfi*rd B. Green (New York:
Routledge, 1991), p. 23.
” Underlying these choices was the requirement for close mteraction and therefore,
physical proximity, between venture capital firms and their portfolio companies.
^ Green included SBICs in his analysis and analyzed the difference in investment
choices between private venture capitalists and SBICs.
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The presence o f h i^ te c h n o lo ^ firm s is also considered an influence on location
decisions for venture capital firms. Florida and Kermey identified two major locational
characteristics o f venture capital firms: ( 1) concentration in financial centers and; (2 )
concentration near high-technologr firms. ^ Using data on the sixty-one most active
venture capital firms in 1985, t h ^ identified three major complexes. These major
complexes, including California, New York, and New England, were each described as
controlling greater than 15 percent o f the $16.3 billion total U. S. venture capital pool in
1985. Two minor complexes, Texas and the Midwest were found to individually control
between 5 to 15 percent o f total venture capital resources.** New York and Chicago
were identified as mature financial centers that attracted venture capital resources. An
extensive level o f high-technology activity, likely to attract venture capital distinguished
California and New England. Indeed, Florida, Smith, and Sechoka found that 50 percent
o f venture capital investment during 1986 went to the states o f California and
Massachusetts.*^ Hence, the presence o f mature financial centers and high technolo@r
firms are regional factors theorized to influence the location o f venture capital resources
and investment
An additional economic foctor considered likely to influence the location
decisions o f venture capital firms is the presence o f large Research and Development
(R&D) universities. Leinbach and Amrhein noted the relationship between venture

***Richard L. Florida and M artin Kenney, “Venture Capital,
Technology, and
Regional Development,” Regional Studies 22.1 (1988), pp. 33-48.
** Florida and K en n ^ (1988) 37.
*^ Richard Florida, Donald F. Smith, Jr., and Elizabeth Sechoka, “Regional Patterns o f
Venture Capital Investment,” Venture Capital: International Comoarisons. ed. M ilford B.
Green (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 102-133.
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capital activity and the presence o f large research universities withm a state or region.**
They cited the proximity o f MTT, Cal-Tech, and Stanford universities as dominant factors
in attracting the lion’s share o f U. S. venture capital resources to Massachusetts and
California. The influence o f R&D activity on location decisions o f high technolo^
firms, and therefore, venture capital firms, is examined in the next section o f this paper.

Empirical Studies o f Regional Location Decisions
Since high technology firms were cited as attractors o f venture (apital activity,
literature regarding market factors that attract high technolo^ firms to regions or cities
was also consulted Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith conducted empirical studies o f the
relationship between university research and development (R&D) spillovers and high
technology employment in 37 American cities.*^ They proposed that university research
generated innovative knowledge which spread through personal interactions to local high
technology firms, and that university R&D provided a an experienced pool o f trained
labor for high technology firms. These factors, they argued, might influence the location
decisions o f high technolo^ firms.
Based upon the empirical results, Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith concluded that a
positive and statistically significant relationship existed between high technology
employment and university R&D expenditures within a given location. ^* Additionally,

** Thomas R. Leinbach and Carl Amrhein, “A Geography o f the Venture Capital hidustry
m the U. S ” Professaonal Geographer 39.2 (1987), p. ISO.
** Zoltan J. Acs, Felix R. FitzRoy, and Ian Smith, “ffigh Technolosr Employment, Wages
and University R&D Spillovers: Evidence From U. S. Cities,” Frontiers o f
Entrepreneurship Research (1995), pp. 274-285.
** Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith (1995) 281.
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they found a statistically significant and positive relationship between wages and high
technology employment This result was counter to the expected direction o f influence
for wages. However, the aufliors posited fliat die specialized skills required for the h i ^
technolosf industry might lead to a shortage o f workers in the area. This shortage could
then require higher bids for wages to attract and retain specialized workers.
Herzog and Schlottman also mcamined the location o f high technology
employment from the viewpoint o f worker mobility and location factors which attracted
high technoloQf workers to certain Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the U. S.“
Although this empirical analysis focused on the fectors influencing choice o f residence
for skilled workers, it did emphasize underlying conditions that impact the location
decisions o f high technology firms. Specifically, Herzog and Schlottman noted th at
In fact although such surveys and case studies show high technology
firms to be “footloose” in terms o f the more traditional location factors
(such as market access and transportation), they also provide evidence
that these firms are dominated in their location decision by their ability
to obtain and retain individuals with specific technical, scientific, and
engineering skills.**

Summary
This review o f research on venture capital investment first summarized the bo<fy
o f literature regarding factors that could mfluence the national level o f new investment in
venture capital. The marginal rate o f taxes on capital gains, and its effect on venture
capital investment, has been widely discussed One bocty of research predicted (fecreases

*®Henry W. Herzog, Jr. and Alan M. Schlottman, “Metropolitan Dimensions o f HighT ecbnolo^ Location in the U. S.: W oriter Mobility and Resicfence Choice,” Industry
Location and Public Policy ( 1988L dp . 169-189.
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m venture capital investment due to increases in capital geins taxation. This effect was
expected because o f the nature o f venture capital investment returns. Since returns on
venture capital are based purely on appreciation, the total return would be subject to
capital gains taxes.
In contradiction, another body o f research predicted little or no effect on national
venture capital investment due to increases in capital gains taxation. This opposing
research noted that m ost investors in venture capital enjoyed a tax-free status. Instead,
pension legislation, which relaxed restrictions on venture capital investment by pension
fiduciaries, was considered key to fueling new investment in venture capital.
Empirical research identified the state o f the stock market for small equities as a
significant statistical influence on national venture capital investm ent Specifically, the
NASDAQ index was found to be statistically significant for predicting new investment in
venture capital. Capital gains taxes did not exhibit a statistically significant influence,
although the r^earchers concluded that the effect o f capital gains taxation on venture
capital investment could not be wholly discounted
A second bo<ty o f literature on regional location decisions for venture capital
investment was also reviewed. Agglomeration tendencies for the venture capital
industries were noted in regions or states with mature financial centers, and in locations
where high tech n o lo ^ firms were present Additionally, researchers cited the proximity
o f large R&D universities as a locational attractor for h i ^ technology firms.
The regional econometric studies reviewed found a statistically significant
relationship between high technology employment and university R&D mqwnditutes

** Herzog, Jr. and Schlottman (1988), 169.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
within a given location. Inasmuch as venture capital location decisions were considered
to be influenced by the presence o f high technology firms, the underlying presence o f
large R&D universities would be considered an economic fector attracting venture
capital to a region or state.
Summaries o f the literature reviewed on new investment in venture capital and on
the regional location o f venture capital funds are presented below in Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 2. Literature Summary: New Investment in Venture Capital
Hypothesis
1. Capital gains taxes distort
efiBdency in portfolio
management

Auerbach
(1992)

Auten,
Berman, &
Randolph
(1989)

Goodman
(1995)

2. Capital ^ in s tax rate increases
lead to drops in venture capital
investm ent

Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)

Bygrave&
Timmons
(1992)

Rahn (1995)

3. Capital gains tax rate
decreases create ineffident
overinvestment in venture
capital

Dworsky
(1986)

4. Capital gains taxes have no
significant effect on venture
capital investm ent

M m arik(l992)

Proterba
(1989)

S. Stock market performance is a
predictor o f venture capital
mvestm ent

Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)

Bygrave &
Timmons
(1992)

6. Investor’s portfolio choices
are influenced by risk
premiums, tastes, and
variances.

Bodie, Kane,
& Marcus
(1989)

Bygrave&
Shulman
(1988)

7. Relaxed pension legislation
(ERISA) increased venture
capital mvestment

Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)

Fenn,Lian&&
Prowse(I995)

C han(1983)
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Table 3 Literature Summary: Regional Location o f Venture Capital Funds
Hypothesis
V enture capital finns locate
nearm ature o r large
financial centers.

FIorida&
Kenney (1988)

FlorWa, Smith,
& Sechoka
(1991)

Green (1991)

2. Venture capital & m s locate
near high technology &ms.

Florida &
Kenney (1988)

Green (1991)

3. Venture capital firms locate
near large research universities.

Acs,Fhzroy,
& Smith (1995

Florida, Smith,
& Sechoka
(1991)
Lembach&
Amrhein
(1987)

4. Umvershy R&D expenditures.
along w ith local economic
Actors, draw high technology
Am s to nearby locations.

A cs,Fitzroy,
& Smith
(1995)

S. High technology firm’s
location decision dommated by
presence o f labor force with
scientific and engineering skills

Herzog &
Schlottman
(1988)

1.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE EMPIRICAL MODELS

Venture capital investment will be examined in two distinct areas. First, the
decisions made by limited partners (individuals, pension managers, etc.) to place new
investment funds with independent private firms will be analyzed on a national level.
Secondly, regional factors such as state corporate tax burdens and government R&D
expenditures will be investigated for their impact on the location o f venture capital
investment funds.

Annual New Investment in Venture Capital
The empirical model used to evaluate annual new investment in venture capital
firms incorporates variables identified by the existing literature and sununarized in Table
2 o f the preceding chapter. Specifically, this model incorporates the significant variables
identified by the Bygrave and Schulman ( 1988) model, but modifies the equation as
follows:**
•

The actual maximum individual capital gains tax rate is used instead o f a dummy
variable.

3»Bygrave and Schulman (1988) 334. NEW VC\ = Pi + P2 NASD AQ(-1)\ +- PjD ■
P4DNASDAQ(-l)t+B.
31
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•

A dummy variable (ERISA2) is added to capture the influence o f the change
in pension fund regulations, which permitted pensions to invest in venture
capital firms. Bygrave and Schuhnan (1988) and Fenn, Liang, and Prowse
(1995) cited pension investment relaxation as a major influence on venture
capital investm ent

•

Two variables reflecting a risk premium, (POSPREM and NEGPREM) are
included based upon the literature o f Bodie, Kane, and Marcus ( 1989),
Bygrave and Schulman (1988), and Chan (1983).

After evaluating the movement o f new venture capital investment over time, a
logarithmic model was chosen for the time series regression.
The general equation constructed for annual new investment in venture capital
(NEWVC) is:
NEW VC = /(S to c k m ark et prices, capital gains tax rates,
pension legislation, and risk prem ium s)
In p articu lar, th e m odel c an b e rep ressed as:
Equation I:

LNEWVQ = p i + p^LNASDAQ» + P3LCGTRATE, + P4ERISA 2 , +
psPOSPREMt + PfiNEGPREMt

” Ackhtional mocfels were evaluated prior to selecting this model. They included a semilogarithmic model, a first differences model, and a linear m odel Further, a variable for
tune was evaluated in all models, as well as a breakpoint variable for the year o f 1980.
A<klitional interest rates and stock market indexes were evaluated, but om itted due to
multicollinearity. Also, consumption, new issues o f securities, a n d c h a n ^ in proAs
were considered.
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where LNEWVQ is the natural log o f new investment flows to independent private firms
in year t;
LNASDAQt

is the natural log o f the year-end closing value for the NASDAQ
hidex.

LCGTRATEt reflects the natural log o f the maximum long-term capital gains
tax rate for each year uncter consideration.
ERISA2t

is a dummy variable, capturing the effects o f ERISA legislative
changes. It is set to zero for 1969 through 1978, and to one for all
subsequent y%rs. This allows the model to capture the influence
o f regulatory changes that allowed pensions to invest in venture
capital.

POSPREMt

reflects the difference between the annualized growth rates o f the
NASDAQ index and annualized Treasury bill returns. It denotes
the risk premium between “risk-free” Treasuries and riskier equity
investments. The value is set to the actual difference when
positive, and to zero otherwise.

NEGPREMt

reflects the difference between annualized Treasury bill returns
and the NASDAQ growth rate when the difference is positive. It is
set to the actual difference when positive, and to zero otherwise.
This variable is included to capture Wiether venture capital
investors «chibit a tymmetrical response to risk premiums.

St

is the errorterm for the régression An assumption o f correct
specffication o f the model anticipates uxkpendently distributed
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error terms from a normal population, with zero expected value and
constant variance.®®
The constant term o f the equation. Pi, reflects an autonomous level o f new
investment in venture capital. The coefficients o f the independent variables are
expected, a priori, to move in the following directions:
p2

is expected to be positive. Many ofthe companies listed on the NASDAQ
tend to be small capitalized, growth firms that are fi>cused on h i^
technolo^.®* As Bygrave and Shulman noted, an increase in its closing
values or IPO volumes could trigger increased investor interest in high
techn olo^ portfolio firms and venture capital investment

While the

NASDAQ index is not viewed as causing venture capital investment, it
does act as an indicator o f demand for investment in small growth
companies.®*
Ps

is expected to have a negative sign. Venture capital investment is
projected to decrease when marginal tax rates on capital gains rise.
Venture capital is more severely affected by tax rate increases because its

®° Robert S. Pinttyck and Daniel L. Rubinfèld, Econometric Models & Economic
Forecasts (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 126.
®* Barron’s Finance and Investment Handbook ed. John Downes and Jordan Elliot
Goorhnan, (Fourth Edition, Woodbury, New York: Barron’s Educational Series, 1995)
744.
Bygrave and Shulman (1988), 327.
®* Other securities market indexes were evaluated, including the S&P 500, AMEX, DowJones Industrial Average, and the Russell 2000 before final selection o f the NASDAQ
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returns are usually pure capital gains, not dividends.
P4

is expected to be positive, reflecting the relaxation o f regulations
regarding pension fund investment in venture capital.

Ps

The direction is unknown. The Nasdaq growth rate was used for the
“high-risk’ return because yearly return data was not available for the
ventiue capital firms considered in this sturty. The Portfolio Allocation
model discussed in Appendix A predicts a positive direction for this
coefficient®* If the risk premium on small growth companies is positive,

ceteris paribus, the optimal proportion o f risky holdings in an investor’s
portfolio would be expected to increase.®® However, ifK asdaq securities
are viewed as substitutes to venture capital investment, this coefficient
could take a n e^ tiv e direction.

Ps

The direction is also unknown. Again, the Portfolio Allocation model
would predict an increase investment in Treasuries if their “risk-free”
return is higher than “risky” returns. However, investors m i^ t substitute
to investments with medium risk, or their tastes might be such that they
always choose high-risk investments.

variable as the one that best A the specifrcatioiL
Bygrave and Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads (19921 p. 262.
®*Bodie, Kane, and Nbrcus (1989), pp. 130-140.
®®Considering foe optùnal proportion o f risky assets is given by y* = [E (q ,)-rj/ Ao%,
the expected return on risky assets (rp) in cr^ses, other things equal, y* also increases.
64

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
Regional Location o f Venture Capital Funds
The regional investment model «camines total venture capital resources (both
new inflows and fund holdings) within fifty states and the District o f Columbia over a
three-year period fi’om 1993-1995. This pooled cross-section, tim e series model tests the
influence o f economic variables identified in Table 3 o f the preceding chapter. While the
literature did not empirically test for attractors o f venture capital to a region or state, it
did identify the variables included in this estimation as important to venture capital
location.
The general equation consriucted for the attraction o f venture capital funds and
firms (VCFUNDS) to a region or state is:®*
VCFUNDS = /(research and development, corporate tax burdens, average weekly
earnings, and unemployment rates)
In particular, the functional form o f the regression equation can be expressed as:
Equation 2:

VCFUNDSu = P, + PiRDh + PsCORPTAXu + P4AWEU

+P5UNEMPit+P6Di, + 8it®*

®* Several additional variables identified by the literature were considered, but omitted
firom the model due to high multicollinearity. Total commercial bank assets by state
were evaluated as an indicator o f financial concentration. The number o f advanced
scientific and engineering degrees awarded by state was also considered as an indicator
o f a technically trained labor force. In addition, earnings by industries with high
technology SIC codes were compiled by state. All o f these variables were highly
correlated with R&D.
®*Additional functional forms evaluated incluckd a full logarithmic modeL a model
incorporating dummy variables for the years o f 1994 and 1995, and a model with
corporate tax dummies set to I for state with corporate income taxes and to zero
otherwise.
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where VCFUNDS are total venture capital fonds, or the stock o f venture capital, in state i
during year t; i reflects state 1 - 51, and t reflects year 1 - 3 :
RDit

is the dollar amount o f federal Research and Development funding
com m itted to colleges and universities in state i during year t

CORPTAXjt

is the ratio o f corporate tax collections to total state government
tax collections for state i during year t It reflects the corporate tax
burden o fth e state.

AWEit

is the average weekly earning in the manufacturing industry for
state i during year t It reflects the cost o f labor.

UNEMPi,

is the unemployment rate for state i during year t It is a general
measure o f the economic growth in the state.®’

Dit

is a dununy variable for each state and the District o f Columbia.
Alaska is omitted from the dummy matrix. This variable is
constructed to consider the intercept for each state.

Sit

is the error term for the regressiorr An assumption o f correct
specification o f the model anticipates independently distributed
error term s from a normal population, with zero expected value
and constant variance.*®

®’ Herzog, Jr. and Schlottman (1991), p. 179 used employment growth as an indicator o f
the general economic condition o f an MSA The unemployment rate was selected as an
alternate meastne.
*®PÙKfyck and Rubinfold (1991), p. 224.
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The coefficients o f the incfependent variables, a priori, are expected to have the
following signs:**
Pz

is expected to be positive, reflecting the influence o f university
research and development spending in attracting venture capital.
The expected direction o f influence is based upon research by
Leinbach and Amrhein that cited large research universities as
dominant factors in attracting venture capital resources to a state
or region.**

p3

is expected to take a negative direction. Herzog and Schlottman
cited the corporate tax climate as a location foctor in attracting
high technology firms to an MSA**. This hypothesis can be
extended to venture capital fimds, which locate near, and invest in
high technology firms. As the percentage o f corporate tax
collections increase, the amount o f venture capital fimds attracted
to the state are expected, ceteris paribus, to decrease.

P4

is expected to take a negative direction. The a priori direction was
theorized by Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith for the effect o f wages upon
high technology employment, and is extended to wages effect upon

** These expectations are based upon research cited in this paper by Florida and Kenner
(1988b); Florida, Smith, and Sechoka (1991); and NGlford B. Green (1991).
** Thomas R. Leinbach and Carl Amrhein, “A Geography o f the Venture Capital hidustry
in the U. S ” Pmffessionaf Geographer39.2 (1987), p. 150.
** Henry W. H erzog Jr. and Alan M. Schlottman, “Metropolitan Dimensions o f
Technolo@r Location in the U. S.: Worker Mobility and Residence Choice,” hidustrv
Location and Public Policy (1988). on. 169-189.
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the location o f high tech n o to ^ venture capital funds and firms7‘^
Ps

is expected to take a negative direction. As the unemployment rate
increases, it reflects a decrease in the general economic condition
of the state. Venture capital firms or funds, therefore, would not
be attracted to states with high unemployment rates.

^6

The direction is unknown. The coefBcient will be added to the
estimation’s constant term to determine the intercept for venture
capital funds within the state. The intercept for Alaska, the
omitted state, is provided by the constant term o f the equation.

Acs, Fhzroy, and Smith (1995), p. 280.
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CHAPTER

V

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section o f the paper presents the sources and construction o f the data used
for the empirical analyses o f annual new venture capital investment and regional venture
capital location factors. A discussion o f the sources o f data for both econometric models
will first be presented Subsequently, procedures used to construct the series will be
summarized These discussions will be followed by the presentation o f descriptive
statistics for the data and interpretations.

Sources o f the Data
The dependent variable for the annual, new investment flow model is the yearly
total dollar volume o f new investment funds placed with independent private firms
(NEWVC). Data for this series were obtained from the Venture Economics Annual
Review: 1996.^^ Venture Economics Investor Services, a division o f Securities Data
Company, compiled the data on this series. This firm maintains extensive databases on
venture capital industry statistics based upon voluntary reporting and monitoring o f the
m arket

Venture Economics hivestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 2.
40
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The ÙKfependent variable for the National Association o f Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) series is the Nasdaq Composite Index. This index
originated in 1971. Annual end-of>month, December closing values for this index from
1971 to 1995 were obtained from The NASDAQ Stock Market Fact Book.^^ Percentage
changes in the Nasdaq Composite Index data were used for the POSPREM and
NEGPREM series.
The source for annualized rates o f return on three-month US Treasury bills is the
Economic Report o f the President^ The capital-gains tax rate variable (CGTRATE)
reflects the maximum individual rates on capital gains. These rates were obtained from
Jane Graveile’s history o f capital gains taxation.^ The dummy variable constructed to
capture the effects o f Employee Retirement Income Security Act regulatory relaxations
on investment by pension fimd fiduciaries (ERISA2) is set to zero for years 1969 through
1978, and to one thereafter. The source for dates on ERISA modifications is the Federal
Reserve System.^’
The source for the dependent variable (VCFUNDS) in the regional location o f
venture capital funds model is Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996.”*

“Monthly Closing Values, Nasdaq Composite Index, 1971-1996,” The 1997 Nasdaq
Stock Market Fact Book: Historical Data. (Online Version,
www.nasdacmews.com/about/factbookT o. 2.
Economic Report o f the President 1996 (Washington: Online via US GPO,
www.access.gpo.gov) Appendix B.
^ Jane G. Gravelle, “History o f Capital Gains Taxation,” The Economic Effects o f
Taxing Capital Income (Cambridge: MTF Press, 1994), pp. 268-71.
George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f the Private
Equitv M arket (Washington: Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, 1995),
L 13-14.
Venture Economics hivestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed.
Ray Lam, (New York: Securities Data Publishing, Inc., 1996).
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The source data for the independent variable reflecting annual, federal obligations
for Research and Development to universities and colleges (RD) were obtained from the
National Science Foundation.^^ The source for the state corporate tax series data
(CORPTAX) is the U. S. Bureau o f the Census.^ State government tax collections were
reported in nominal dollars for fiscal years 1993,1994, and 1995. Source data for the
Average Weekly Earnings series (AWE) and the unemployment rate series (UNEMP)
were obtained from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics.^^

Construction o f the Series
In the model for annual new investment in venture capital, the data series were
constructed as follows:
NEWVC

The data is reported in annual, calendar-year volumes for the
period o f 1969 through 1995. Data were not available on this
series prior to 1969. The nominal dollar values reflecting annual
new investment in venture capital in million dollar increments
were converted to a natural logarithmic form.

NASDAQ

This variable reflects a market capitalization-weighted index

“Federal Obligations for Science and Engineering Research and Development to
Universiti% and Colleges By State, Institution, and Aeæncv.” Snrvev o f F ie ra i Support
to Universities. Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions (Online via National Science
Foundation/SRS, www.nsf.gov. Fiscal Years 1993-1995), Appendbc B.
^ “State Government Tax Collections, by State: 1993,1994, and 1995,” Statistical
Abstract o f the United States (Washington. DC: U. S. Bureau o f the Census, 1995,1996,
and 1997).
^ “Average Weekly Earnings,” State and Area Emplovment. Hours, and Earnings and
Local Area Unemplovment Statistics. (Online via U. S. Department o f Labor Bureau o f
Labor Statistics Data, www.bls.gov/datahome. 1998).
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covering all Nasdaq common stock, in atWition to foreign stock,
ADRs and the Nasdaq-lOO.*^ The natural logarithms o f year-end
index values are used from the year o f the Nasdaq Composite’s
conception (1971) to 1995.
CGTRATE

The natural logarithms o f the actual maximum individual tax rates
on capital gains were used in this series.

ERISA2

is a qualitative, mdependent or dununy variable that takes values
o f zero or one.

POSPREM

To construct this series, first the armual percentage changes in
Nasdaq index values were calculated Subsequently, the
armualized percentage yield on three-month Treasury bills^ was
subtracted from the Nasdaq percentage changes. Then, this
variable was set to the actual value when the difference was
positive, and to zero otherwise.

NEGPREM

This series was constructed by subtracting the Nasdaq growth rate
from the annualized yield on three-month Treasury bills. Actual
positive values were used when they occurred, and the variable
was set to zero otherwise.

The regional model’s time series and cross-section data were ortkred
alphabetically by state, and then pooled by year from 1993 through 1995. The variables

** Jefifi^ W. Smith, James P. Selway, m , Lorraine Reilly, and D. Timothy McCormick,”
NASD Data Relating to the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., and its Listed Companies,”
NASD Working Paner 97-Ot (Washington. DC: 1999), pp. 28-31.
^ Economic Report o f the President 1996. Appendix B, Table B071.
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were constructed as follows:
VCFUNDS

VCFUNDS reflects total, nominal dollars in million dollar
increments invested with aU venture capital firms located within a
given state for a given year durmg the period o f 1993 through
199S.^ It includes both new investment funds from limited
parmers into venture capital firm s, and venture capital funds that
have been invested into portfolio firms under active management
by venture capital firms located within the state. Fiffy states and
the District o f Columbia are considered.

RD

Nominal dollar values in million dollar increments for federal
research and development obligations to universities were given by
state and by year.

CORPTAX

Nominal values for state corporate tax collections were ratioed to
total state tax collections on an armual basis.

AWE

The 12-month average for weekly earnings in manufacturing are
given in nominal, unadjusted dollar values.

UNEMP

Unemployment rates are expressed as percentiles.

STATE

The state dummy variable is set to one for each o f the three years
that observations for that state are included and to zero otherwise.

86

Venture Economic Investor Services (1996), 13.
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Summary Statistics on the Data
Summary statistics on data used in the annual new investment in venture
capital model are presented m Table 4.

Table 4. Summary Statistics: Annual New Investment Model

Mean
Median
Maxanum
Minimum
Std. Dev.

POSPREM NEŒ REM

NEWVC

NASDAQ

CGTRATE

ERISA2

1725.583
1623.500
4227.000
15.000
1501.649

335.433
262.975
1052.13
59.820
261.396

0.322
0.280
0.480
0.200
0.102

0.708
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.464

0.107
0.083
0.500
0.000
0.127

0.071
0.000
0.429
0.000
0.130

+

-

+

7

?

Expected Sign

Only 24 observations are included in the estimation covering the period o f
1972 to 1995 because o f the need for percentage changes in the NASDAQ variable. The
Nasdaq Index originated in 1971 and thus constrains the number o f observations. The
average amount o f new investment in venture capital over the 24-year period examined is
$1,726 million with a standard deviation o f $1,502 million. The large range o f the
NEWVC variable reflects the growth o f investment in venture capital as well as the use
o f nominal dollar values.
The average value o f the NASDAQ indec over the 24-year period is
335.43. Its la r ^ range reflects the growth in investment in high technology, smallcapitalized stocks over the period examined. The maximum rate on capital gains taxes
for individuals (CGTRATE) was 48 percent during the period o f evaluation, and the
minimum rate was 20 percent. Additionally, for 71 percent ofthe years between 1969
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and 1995, regulations were relaxed for investment m venture capital by pension
fiduciaries (ERISA2).
The average positive premium (POSPREM) for NASDAQ investments
compared to Treasury bill returns was ten percent during the period o f observation. The
maximum positive difference for NASDAQ growth rates was 50 percent The average
positive difference between Treasury bills and NASDAQ when Treasury returns were
greater (NEGPREM) is 7.1 percent The maximum positive difference for a Treasury bill
return during the period o f the study is 43 percent
Correlations between the annual new investment variables are presented
below in Table 5.

Table 5. Annual New Investment Correlation Matrix
NEWVC
NEWVC
NASDAQ
CGTRATE
ERISA2
POSPREM
NEGPREM

1.000
0.715
-0.551
0.730
-0.066
-0.143

NASDAQ CGTRATE

1.000
-0.405
0.596
0.327
-0266

I.OOO
-0.832
-0.068
0213

ERISA2

1.000
0.129
-0226

POSPREM NEGPREM

I.OOO
-0.484

1.000

New investment with independent private firms is positively correlated with the
NASDAQ and ERISA2 variables, which meets the a priori expectations. Also, as
theorized, NEWVC is negatively correlated with the capital gains tax rate variable. The
POSPREM variable is negatively correlated with new venture capital investm ent This
direction indicates that the NASDAQ stock maricet might act as a substitute for venture
capital investment, drawing away venture capital dollars Wren its “risk premium is h i ^
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The NEGPREM variable is also negatively correlated with venture capital investment,
revealing a potential asymmetry in investor responses. Also, ERISA2 and CGTRATE
have a strong negative correlation, raising the possibility o f multicollinearity.
The summary statistics on the data used for empirical tests on the regional
location o f venture capital fonds are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Summary Statistics: Regional Investment Model

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Expected Sign

VCFUNDS

RD

CORPTAX

AWE

UNEMP

^TATE

644.875
38.400
10919.000
0.000
1735.884

226.682
138.110
1668250
9.750
294.611

6.312
5.600
39.160
0.000
4.581

492.972
493.120
724240
367.160
62.790

5.771
5.600
10.900
2600
1.438

0.020
0.000
I.OOO
0.000
0.139

+

-

-

-

•>

The average amount o f venture capital fonds across all thirty-five states
(VCFUNDS) was $645 million between 1993 and 1995. This variable exhibits a large
range and a lai^e standard deviation because o f the concentration o f venture capital funds
in some states, for example, California, Massachusetts, and New York.*’
The average amount o f research and development obligations (RD) to universities
within a state was $227 million. Again, a large standard deviation and range exists for
this series due to the concentration o f large, research-oriented universities in some states.

^ Richard Florida, Donald F. Smith, Jr., and Elûcabeth Sechoka, “Regional Patterns o f
Venture Capital Investment,” Venture Capital: Intemational Comparisons, ed. M ilford B.
Green (New York: Routledge, 1991). The authors noted the concentration o f venture
capital funds withm the Northeast and Pacific or W est Coast regions.
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The average proportion o f corporate taxes to total state tax collections
(CORPTAX) is 6,3 percent, with the maximum proportion being 39 percent for the state
o f Alaska in 1993 “
The average weekly earnings in manufacturing (AWE) for the SO states and the
District o f Columbia between 1993 and 1995 were $493. The unemployment rate
(UNEMP) averaged 5.77 percent across the states during the period o f observatioiL West
Virginia experienced the highest unemployment rate o f 109 percent in 1993. The lowest
unemployment rate during the period was 2.6 percent in 1995 in the state o f Nebraska.
The summary statistics for the state dummy (STATE) is the same for each state
observed. Each o f the 50 states and the District o f Columbia contributed approximately
two percent o f the observations in the pooled, cross-section data.
Table 7 presents the correlation matrix for the variables in the regional
estimation.

** “State Government Tax Collections, by State: 1993,1994, and 1995,” Statistical
Abstract o f the United States (Washmgton, DC: U. S. Bureau ofthe Census, 1995,1996,
and 1997).
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Table 7. Correlation NWrix for the Regional Model
VCFUNDS
VCFUNDS
RD
CORPTAXl
AWE
UNEMP
AK
AL
ARK
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
m
lA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KT
LA
MASS
MD
ME
MI
MM
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
ORE
PA
RI
SC
SO

1.000
0.871
0.171
0.147
0281
-0.053
-0.053
-0.053
-0.048
0.720
-0.014
0.125
-0.051
-0.049
-0.022
-0.039
-0.053
-0.044
-0.053
0.109
-0.046
-0.052
-0.053
-0.052
0.311
0.065
-0.051
-0.052
-0.004
-0.043
-0.053
-0.053
-0.041
-0.053
-0.053
-0.053
0.042
-0.051
-0.053
0.512
-0.011
-0.050
-0.049
-0.004
-0.050
-0.051
-0.053

RD

1.000
0.110
0237
0.258
-0.094
-0.022
-0.092
-0.029
0.655
0.001
0.000
-0.096

■0.049
0.011
0.002
-0.082
-0.043
-0.101
0.097
-0.024
-0.080
-0.080
-0.057
0272
0.246
-0.103
0.072
-0.019
-0.004
-0.086
-0.097
0.094
-0.098
-0.089
-0.079
-0.013
-0.060
-0.097
0.369
0.049
-0.086
-0.042
0239
-0.081
-0.077
-0.104

CORPTAXl

AWE

UNEMP

AK

1.000
0.219
0.053
0.639
-0.058
-0.023
-0.023
0.112
-0.078
0.118
0.129
-0.195
-0.040
-0.004
-0.135
-0.056
-0.007
0.057
0.101
0.017
-0.041
-0.023
0.107
-0.068
-0.062
0.219
0.009
-0.059
-0.026
0.008
0.034
0.026
-0.030
0.300
0.041
-0.066
-0.195
0.074
-0.045
-0.082
0.005
0.086
-0.032
-0.049
-0.029

1.000
0.114
0.051
-0.104
-0.208
-0.062
0.045
0.026
0.177
0.195
0.091
-0.183
-0.126
-0.040
0.068
-0.058
0.046
0.194
0.026
-0.017
0.157
0.067
0.116
-0.021
0.474
0.059
-0.003
-0234
0.000
-0.174
-0.154
-0.090
0.003
0.139
-0.181
0.009
0.012
0289
-0.019
0.008
0.052
-0.170
-0.171
-0 2 52

1.000
0.181
0.085
-0.030
0.016
0.279
-0.119
0.003
-0.093
0.276
0.059
-0.046
-0.033
-0.201
-0.004
0.036
-0.076
-0.086
-0.010
0.167
0.033
-0.030
0.121
0.033
-0.148
-0.037
0.059
-0.007
-0.122
-0.188
-0.300
-0.069
0.111
0.098
0.052
0.121
-0.017
-0.023
0.006
0.062
0.151
0.056
-0247

1.000
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
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Table 7, continued

TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

VCFUNDS
-0.035
0.018
-0.052
-0.040
-0.053
-0.022
-0.035
-0.053
-0.053

RD
-0.031
0.194
-0.046
-0.008
-0.092
0.042
0.014
-0.095
-0.102

CORPTAXl
0.040
-0.195
-0.046
-0.063
-0.047
-0.195
0.011
0.037
-0.195

AWE
-0.145
-0.028
-0.090
-0.059
0.005
0.216
0.075
0.054
-0.066

UNEMP
-0.053
0.075
-0201
-0.093
-0.096
0.102
-0.139
0 J4 2
-0.056

AK
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020
-0.020

The amount o f venture capital fonds within a state (VCFUNDS) is positively and
highly correlated with the federal research and development obligations to universities
within the state (RD). The VCFUNDS variable is also positively correlated with the ratio
o f corporate taxes to total state taxes (CORPTAX), the average weekly earnings in
manufacturing within a state (AWE), and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) counter to a

priori expectations. States that exhibit a positive correlation with venture capital include
California (72 %), Connecticut (13 %), Illinois (11 %), Nfossachusetts (31%), Maryland
(7%), New Jersey (4%), New York (51%), and Texas (2%). These positive correlations
meet the literature’s findings that a major portion o f U. S. venture capital tends to be
concentrated in or attracted to the Northeast or to California, with smaller concentrations
in the Midwest and Texas.*^ All states are correlated with each other at a negative 2
percent as demonstrated by Alaska (AK).

Richard L. Florida and M artin Kenner, “Venture Capital, High Technolo^, and
Regional Development” Regional Studies 22.1 (1988), pp. 33-48.
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CHAPTER

VI

Empirical Results
Empirical tests were conducted for both annual new investment in venture capital
and regional location factors for venture capital funds. Leading this section is a
presentation o f the results o f the estimation on annual new investment in venture capital.
Afterward, the results o f the regional estimation are discussed.

Armual New Investment in Venture Capital Estimation Results
The results o f the initial, unrestricted estimation for annual new investment with
independent, private firms are presented below in Table 8.

51
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Table 8. Annual New Investment Estimation Results
Dependent Variable is LNEWVC
Included observations; 24
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNASDAQ
LCGTRATE
ERISA2
POSPREM
NEGPREM

-3.885
1.326
-1.780
1.360
-2.004
0.523

1.538
0.272
0.657
0.630
1.112
1.112

-2.526
4.870
-2.735
2.160
-1.802
0.472

0.021
0.000
0.014
0.045
0.088
0.644

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. o f r^ e s s fo n
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbm-Watson stat

0.940
0.923
0.572
5.893
-17.204
1.952

Mean dependent var
ST), dependent var

6.386
2.059

F-statisdc
Prob(F-statisric)

55.961
0.000

The coefficient for the NASDAQ variable is positive and statistically significant,
suggesting that new investment in venture capital increases when securities market prices
for high technology stock is increasing. When the NASDAQ index increases by one
percent, venture capital investments are predicted to increase by 1.33 percent Although
causality is not inforred, growth in small-capitalized investments during the year is
predicted to increase investor interest in private entrepreneurial firms backed by venture
capital. The coefficient for capital gains tax rates (LCGTRATE) is statistically
significant and negative. This elasticity takes the a p r/o rr direction. The statistically
signifi«m t coefficient for pension investment changes (ERISA) also takes the ocpected
direction.
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The variable constructed to reflect a positive NASDAQ risk premium
(POSPREM) is statistically significant and negative. It can be interpreted as showing a
substitution effect between venture capital investments and NASDAQ investments when
the Nasdaq Index is experiencing h i ^ growth. Alternately, the variable constructed to
reflect positive Treasury premiums (NEGPREM) is statistically insignificant and
positive. Its positive direction might suggest that investors in venture capital are
disposed towards riskier investments, and would not consider Treasury bills as substitute.
Another inference posited by Bygrave and Shulman is that Treasury bill rates represent
the cost o f debt for entrepreneurs, and as the rate rises, venture capital firms become
more attractive sources o f financing.’®
The Durbin-Watson statistic was tested for positive autocorrelation.’ ' This test
failed to reject the null hypothesis o f no positive autocorrelatioiL Given that the small
number o f observations allow only 19 degrees o f freedom, the results o f the estimation
are not robust” Additionally, the regression does not account for non-stationary
properties o f the data. However, the estimation does identify statistically significant
explanatory variables for investment in venture capital.

^ W illiam D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for
Venture Capital?” Frontiers o f Entrepreneurship Research (Wellesley, MA: Babson
College Entrepreneurship Conference, 1988), pp. 327-335.
For n=24 and k=5, the Du is 1.902 at 5 percent significance. The actual DurbinWatson statistic o f 1.952 fidls between the Du value and 2, yielding a test result o f no
significant serial correlatioiL
” Nfichael Brennan and Thomas Carroll, Quantitative Economics and Econometrics
(Cincmnati: South-Western PublishmgCo., 1987), p. 365.
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Regional Venture Capital Estimation Results
The results o f the estimation for regional influences on total venture capital
resources are presented in Table 9. A W hite Heteroskedasticify-Consistent estimation
was performed because non-constant variance was a concern due to large differences in
the magnitudes o f variables between states. ”
Table 9. Regional Venture Capital Estimation Results
D épendait Variable is VCFUNDS
Included observations: 153
W hite Ifeteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C **
R D **
CORPTAXl
AW E*
UNEM P*
A L*
ARK**
A Z**
CA
C O **
CT
D C **
DE
F L **
G A **
H I**
lA * *
ID
IL
IN
K S*
K T **
LA **
MASS
M D **
ME
M I**
M N*

1732.196
8.088
-1.280
-3.038
-50.972
-1487.790
-518.978
-1298.434
-3100.720
-1346.356
653.948
-634.707
84.112
-1795.824
-1828235
-471.755
-951.612
-148.659
-1336.777
-1056210
-430.707
-457.590
-498.989
-1768228

870.684
2.654
4.128
1.579
26.156
516.732
244242
459.415
3812.685
598.502
493234
281.489
131.515
738.417
668265
199.586
343.845
131.823
1084258
364.431
172.485
183236
201269
2041.784
1897.709
103285
756.717
464.706

1.989
3.048
-0210
-1.924
-1.949
-2.879
-2.125
-1826
-0.813
-2250
1226
-2255
0.640
-1432
-1735
-1364
-1768
-1.128
-1232
-1898
-1497
-1493
-2.478
-0.866
-2273
O.IOI
-3.053
-1.845

0.049
0.003
0.757
0.057
0.054
0.005
0.036
0.006
0.418
0.027
0.188
0.026
0.524
0.017
0.007
0.020
0.007
0.262
0221
0.005
0.014
0.014
0.015
0.389
0.025
0.919
0.003
0.068

A 2 U .n o
10.485
-2309.879
-857287

93

Herbert White, “A Heteroskedasticify-Consistent Covariance M atrix Estimator and a
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica 48 (May 1980), pp. 817-838.
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Table 9, contmued

M O **
M S**
MT
N C **
ND*
N E **
N H **
NI
N M **
NV
NY
O H **
OK*
O RE**
PA **
R I**
SC**
SD *
TN **
TX **
U T **
V A **
V T*
W A **
W I**
WV
WY

Coefficient
-1602.384
-6I2.% 9
-134.416
-3495.493
-415.153
-548.853
-451.517
-138.935
-931.784
-105.682
-982.208
-1704.835
-323.760
-1008.101
-5080.128
-513.108
-663.586
■481.569
-1254.506
-4162.184
-1210.668
-1602.083
-261.713
-1771264
-1762.015
86.186
-171264

Std. E rror
577.083
274212
118.812
1200.538
216.439
237.323
161.029
431.535
363.212
127.712
2823.237
720.396
165.491
358.934
1859.393
241.673
282.819
268.066
498.033
1658.109
411.347
581.317
146.947
718.482
635.716
91.954
158.342

t-Statistic
-2.777
-2235
-1.131
-2512
-1.918
-2.313
-2.804
-0.322
-2.565
-0.828
-0.348
-2.367
-1.956
-2.809
-2.732
-2.123
-2.346
-1.796
-2.519
-2.510
-2.943
-2.756
-1.781
-2.465
-2.772
0.937
-1.082

*p<0.10
♦ *p <0 . 05 * * * p < 0.001
0.990
R-squared
0.984
Adjusted Rsquared
S .E .o f
219.795
Mean dependent var
regression
Sum squared 4734367.000
S D . dependent var
resid
Log
-1008.102
F-statistic
likelihood
Durbm2.003
Prob(F-statistic)
W atson stat

Prob.
0.007
0.028
0.261
0.005
0.058
0.023
0.006
0.748
0.012
0.410
0.729
0.020
0.053
0.006
0.008
0.036
0.021
0.076
0.013
0.014
0.004
0.007
0.078
0.015
0.007
0.351
0.282

644.875
1735.884
173.757
0.000

The coefficient for federal Research and Development obligations to universities
in a state (RD) takes the expected positive Erection and is statistically significant at 98
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percent For every million federal R&D dollars obligated to a state university, ceteris

pembusy state venture capital funds are predicted to increase by approximately 8 .1
m illion dollars. However, the coefficient for the proportion o f corporate taxes to overall
state taxes (CORPTAXl), while taking the expected direction, is statistically
insignificant
The average weekly earnings’ coefficient (AWE) takes the expected negative
direction, and is statistically significant All else equal, venture capital funds in a state
are predicted to decrease by S3.04 million for every dollar increase in a state’s average
weekly earnings in manufacturing. Likewise, the unemployment rate coefficient
(UNEMP) is statistically significant takes an a priori negative directioiL A one-percent
increase in a state’s unemployment rate is predicted to decrease venture fund location in
that state by approximately 51 million dollars, ceteris paribus. Finally, the coefficients
on many o f the state dummy variables are statistically significant and negative.
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CHAPTER

Vn

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the venture capital industry from a national and a
regional perspective. Empirical models were constructed to evaluate national investment
in venture capital and the location o f funds. The study has identified statistically
significant, explanatory variables for new venture capital investment and the location o f
venture capital funds. For new investment in venture capital, these variables include the
NASDAQ Index, pension fimd legislation, capital gains tax rates, and risk premiums.
The statistically significant variables for regional location o f venture capital fimds
include university research and development funding, average weekly earnings, and the
unemployment rate.
A positive elasticity o f 1.326 was found between new investment in venture
capital and the NASDAQ indec Bygrave and Schulman (1988) also found a statistically
significant, positive relation between venture capital investment and the NASDAQ index.
This folding indicates that rising investments in NASDAQ, or public markets that carry
small-capitalized, high technolo^ firm s, may predict increased interest in small, high
technology venture capital firms. However, the results do not ùnply causality between
NASDAQ and venture capital investment. The purpose o f the stu<ty was not to
investigate the causal relationship between venture capital and the NASDAQ index, but
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to extend upon prior research o f the economic conditions that impact venture capital
investm ent
The relaxation o f pension fiduciary rules, allowing pension fimds to invest in
venture capital was also found to have a positive effect on new venture capital
investm ent In contrast to previous research, capital gains tax rate increases were found
to have a significant, negative influence on new investment in venture capital. Likewise,
when the NASDAQ Index growth rate exceeded Treasury bill returns, providing a risk
premium, new investment in venture capital was found to decline.
On a state or regional level, this stutty found that venture capital fimds were
attracted to states with higher levels o f university research and development fimding.
Additionally, the study identified unemployment rates and average weekly earnings as
negative influences on venture capital fimd location.
The results o f this study suggest that proposed policy changes on capital gains tax
rates o r investmem regulation should incorporate an analysis o f the legislation’s effect on
venture capital investm ent Legislative changes that reduce venture capital investment
could lead to a decrease in our nation’s economic growth. Also, the study suggests that
states seeking to attract high technology firms should evaluate the level o f research and
development conducted at universities within the state.
The objective o f this stucty was to further identify the variables that impact new
investment in venture capital, and to determine what regional or state variables
influenced the location o f venture capital funds. The analysis revealed significant
variables that impact venture capital investment. However, the model on national
investment contained only 24 armual observations, and therefore, is not statistically
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robust As this industry matures, and more data become available, future studies will be
able to identify the variables that affect venture capital investment with greater
confidence. The venture capital industry has contributed to economic growth in America
by funding some o f America’s leading entrepreneurs. And, as Benjamin Mokry said,
“The entrepreneur has become somethmg o f a talisman and symbol o f hope for the
American economy as it moves into the twenty-first century.”’*

94 Benjamin Mokry, Entrepreneurship and Public Policy: Can Government Stimulate
Business Startups? (Westport. CT: Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 2.
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APPENDIX

A

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In their study ofthe private equity maricet, including venture capital, Fenn, Liang,
and Prowse suggested that limited information about private transactions had worked to
depress the development o f academic literature in this area.”

Bygrave and Timmons

also cited the lack o f conceptual models for venture capital flows when designing an
empirical study.”
However, economic and financial theories have been developed on investment
and economic growth. In his evaluation o f economic growth, Abramovitz noted “die
process o f capital formation involves three distinct, if interdependent activities:””
saving, finance, and investment And, investment theory can be applied to venture
capital investment and the variables that influence it

Venture Capital Firms and Financial Intermediation
When considering investment theory, venture capital firms can be viewed as
financial intermediaries, providing investors (limited partners) with

” Fenn, L ian^ and Prowse (1995) 3.
” Bygrave and Tunmons, “A nB npirical Model” (1985) 106.
” Moses Abramovitz, Capital Formation and Economic Growth: A NBER Conference
Report (Chicago: UhwersityofChic% o Press, 1955) p. 4.
60
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infonnational and monitoring services on portfolio firms (entrepreneurs).” As financial
intermediaries, venture capital firms may serve to reduce information or search costs for
investors in a market characterized by asymmetric information. Additionally, venture
capital firms, as financial intermediaries, may reduce the risk o f asset ownership for
private investors through “transformation” o f the assets by spreading ownership across a
number o f portfolio firms.”
However, even with venture capitalists acting as financial intermediaries, an
investment in a small, entrepreneurial firm entails a higher degree o f risk on return than
investment in less volatile assets such as Treasuries. Therefore, investors in high-risk
venture capital equities, require a premium on the asset’s return in order to compensate
them for the additional risk. This risk premium is detailed in the financial model of
investment theory developed by Bodie, Kane, and Marcus. '®®

Portfolio Allocation Model
The Bodie, Kane, and Marcus model for portfolio allocation considers a riskneutral investor.

If investors are assumed to be risk neutral, a risk premium or

extended return is placed upon assets with highly variable returns. For example, a
diversified portfolio might hold a proportion (y) o f its investment fimds m risky assets.

” Chan, Yuk-Shee, “On the Positwe Role o f Financial fotermediation in Allocation o f
Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect hiformation,” The Journal O f Finance 38.5
(December 1983), pp. 1543-1568.
” Hester, Donald D., “On the Theory o f Financial Intermediation,” De Economist 142.2
(1994), p. 134.
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus. Investments (1989), pp. 130-140.
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and the remaining proportion (1 - y) in risk-free instruments, such as three-month
treasury bills. If the risk-free return is denoted by rr and the risky rate o f return denoted
by rp, the authors define the return on the complete portfolio (rc) as:'”
re = yrp + (l-y)T f
and the expected rate o f return as:
E(rc) = yE(rp) + ( l - y ) r r
= rf + y[E(rp) - r j
The risk premium o f the risky asset is, therefore, E(r^) - rf. Additionally, if the
investor’s utility (U) for the portfolio is defined as a positive function of the rate o f
return, a negative function of the variance (a^) in return, and a negative function o f a
coefficient o f risk aversion (A), then utility is maximized by the following function:
Max U = E (rJ - l/2AcTc = ff + y[E(rp) - r j - l/2y^A(Tp
where the standard deviation o f the portfolio is:'®’

and the variance o f the portfolio is:

(Tc = r(rp
Setting the first derivative of the maximization equation to zero and solving for y yields
the optimal proportion of rislty assets an investor would hold in a portfolio:

y* = [E(rp)-r£l/ACT’p
Therefore, the optimal amount o f risky assets held in a portfolio decreases in
proportion to the level o f risk aversion and the degree o f variance in returns. Alternately,

'®' Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 130-140.
'®^ Bodie, Kane, and Marcus ^989) 167.
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it increases in proportion to the level o f the risk premium. Venture capital investment is
characterized by a high (kgree o f risk, and therefore, must offer a high-expected risk
premium.
Bygrave and Timmons remarked upon unrealistic venture-capital investor
expectations o f returns approaching 50 percent annually.'®* ThQr cited a stucty which
highlighted the relationship between high expected returns and high risk, saying, “Just
6.8% o f the 383 investments made in portfolio companies between 1969 and 1985
returned ten times or more on invested capital. And more than 60% o f all these
investments either lost money or failed to exceed savings account rates o f return.”'®^
This section first reviewed the role o f venture capital firms as financial
intermediaries. It noted that venture capital firms might reduce search costs and help to
balance asymmetric information between investors and portfolio firms. Risk o f asset
ownership is also reduced because the venture capital firm spreads the investor’s fimds
into equity positions across a number o f portfolio firms.
Subsequently, the portfolio allocation model was reviewed. This model
examined the composition o f an investment portfolio composed o f risk-fiee and rislty
assets. '®® After defining a utility-maximization function, the optimal amount o f risky
assets held in an investment portfolio was defined as a function o f the investor’s risk
aversion, the variance in the asset’s return, and the level o f the risk premium offered on
the risky asset

'®’ Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 172.
'®* Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 9.
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 9.
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 130-140.
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